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John Harrison 
 
URBAN REGIONS – GOVERNANCE 
 
 
This short paper addresses the issue of ‘governance’ in urban regions. 
Following a brief introduction outlining the key features in the re-emergence of 
city-regions, it highlights why ‘good governance’ is such an important asset for 
a city-region. This is followed by a presentation of some of the various city-
regional models currently being adopted throughout the world. Finally the 
paper explores some of the tensions, conflicts and challenges which exist in 
the governance of city-regions. 
 
Introduction: the re-emergence of city-regions 
Until the 1970s, modern nation-states were the site/scale at which economic 
management was conducted, social welfare delivered, and political subjects 
were treat as citizens. However, against the backdrop of a protracted 
economic crisis, the deindustrialisation of core manufacturing regions, and the 
fiscal crisis of the state has seen the primacy afforded to the nation-state 
challenged by the emergence of new state spaces. One such challenger has 
been the urban region, or as it has been more commonly known, the city-
region. 
 
The city-region concept has been in common usage amongst urbanists, 
economists, and planners since the 1940s, representing an area (rural 
hinterland) linked to a core (city) by functional ties. Despite a rich scientific 
history, the concept has been enjoying something of a revival in recent years. 
Divorced from views that predicted ‘the death of distance’ and ‘the end to 
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geography’, the re-emergence of city-regions has served to highlight the 
importance of dense nodes of socio-economic activity within a globalized 
world. In a world where interactions are increasingly described in terms of 
flows of capital, knowledge, people and services, rather than in terms of 
organized exchanges, recent research has demonstrated how the dynamics 
of globalization has tended to crystallize not only in states but in specific city-
regions as well.  
 
In his 2001 book Global City-Regions, Allen Scott describes how city-regions 
are “beginning to function as the spatial foundations of the new world system” 
(p. 1). This is because city-regions are the nodes and hubs of these flows, 
acting as centres and gateways for global business, culture, and social 
relations. They are the site from which the flows originate and terminate. In 
the words of Scott, city-regions “function as territorial platforms for much of 
the post-Fordist economy that constitutes the dominant leading edge of 
contemporary capitalist development, and as important staging posts for the 
operations of multinational corporations” (p. 4). Moreover, “the geographic 
nature of these networks tends more and more to override purely political 
boundaries so that they are increasingly free from regulatory supervision on 
the part of nation-states” (p. 4). In these senses, city-regions have emerged 
as an apparent challenger to the primacy of the nation-state. 
 
Consequently, as city-regions increasingly become the site for economic 
activity and basic service provision that is independent of the national 
economic environment, there is a growing volume of research devoted to the 
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interplay between city-region development and governance. This focuses on 
how city-region elites have to cope with two processes simultaneously – 
globalization and regionalization – and how there are no neatly separated 
layers of institutions and decision-makers in today’s multi-layered and multi-
tiered structures of governance. As a consequence, none of them function as 
a unitary actor. Instead, different groups of actors simultaneously try to exert 
control over the developments affecting their respective city-regions. Build into 
this the recognition that city governments have seen their influence wane as 
the new anchors of regional development – airports, universities, science 
parks – are increasingly located beyond city lines, and it is clear to see why 
questions relating to the governance of city-regions have become a topical, 
but also thorny, issue in recent years. 
 
City-regions are not simply smaller states. Where nation-states were seen to 
offer stability, the universal logic underpinning diverse city-region formation in 
different parts of the world is the territorial restlessness inherent in the 
capitalist system. This means that instead of looking at neatly separated 
layers of institutions and decision-makers which form a nested hierarchy 
running from the global to the local – like Russian Matryoshka dolls – we must 
now recognise the plurality of interdependent actors and polities that comprise 
city-regions. City-regions are connected to the macro-regions, to their states, 
and increasingly to one another. Their transnational outreach promotes 
greater territorial inter-connectivity between cities and city-regions. However, 
within this global network city-regions are forced to compete against one 
another for investment and trade. They have to market, sell, and place 
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themselves in a competitive environment where their position in league tables 
defines their character. These circumstances can no longer be described 
using the notion of government. Instead we have to develop and make 
operational the concept of governance on the level of city-regions. 
Governance is required any time multiple actors come together to accomplish 
an end. It is the process through which multiple actors make decisions that 
direct their collective efforts. In city-regions the group of actors is too large to 
efficiently make all necessary decisions, so a new entity is required to 
facilitate the process. 
 
Urban governance as an asset of a city or region 
According to the Institute on Governance one simple definition of governance 
is “the art of steering societies and organizations”. Urban governance is 
therefore about the more strategic aspects of steering, making the big 
decisions about the direction of city-region development and the roles that 
actors will fulfil. The ability to make these decisions relies on city-region actors 
to delegate a large portion of the decision-making responsibility to this entity. 
However, it is a little more complicated than this. Steering suggests that 
governance is a straightforward process, akin to a steersman in a boat. But by 
its very nature, governance is complicated by the fact that it involves multiple 
actors, not a single helmsman.  
 
These actors are important because they articulate their interests, influence 
how decisions are made, who the decision-makers are and what decisions 
are taken. They feed into the decision-making process, but the decision-
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makers are then accountable to those same actors for the output, and 
process for producing it. The aim of governance – the taking of decisions and 
rendering of account – is good governance. Here the desired results are 
achieved and achieved in the right way.  
 
Just as much as bad governance can be a major barrier for city-regions, good 
governance can be a key asset for a city-region looking to elevate its position 
in the national and international competitiveness league tables. There is, 
however, no universal template for good governance in city-regions. Instead, 
each city-region must tailor its definition of good governance to suit its needs 
and values. What is right for one city-region will not be right for another. This 
goes some way to explaining why city-regions across the world operate 
through a variety of different governance models.  
 
Before looking at the various city-regional governance models, it is first 
necessary to highlight a number of key principles which underpin all examples 
of good governance. According to the United Nations, good governance has 
nine major characteristics.  
 
1 Participation: all actors should have a voice in decision-making, 
either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that 
represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on 
freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to 
participate constructively. 
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2 Rule of law: legal frameworks should be fair and enforced 
impartially. 
3 Transparency: transparency is built on the free flow of information. 
Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to 
those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to 
understand and monitor them. 
4 Responsiveness: institutions and processes try to serve all 
stakeholders. 
5 Consensus orientation: good governance mediates differing 
interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best 
interests of the group, and where possible, on policies and 
procedures. 
6 Equity: all actors have opportunities to improve or maintain their 
well-being. 
7 Effectiveness and efficiency: processes and institutions produce 
results that meet needs while making the best use of resources. 
8 Accountability: decision-makers in government, the private sector 
and civil society organizations are accountable to the public, as well 
as to institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs 
depending on the organizations and whether the decision is internal 
or external to an organization.  
9 Strategic vision: leaders and public have a broad and long-term 
perspective on good governance and human development, along 
with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also 
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an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities 
in which that perspective is grounded. 
 
This is not a prescriptive model for good governance, rather it is a series of 
aspirations. Each city-region will be stronger on some aspirations and weaker 
on others. This depends on their governance model, but moreover, it depends 
on the negotiations that take place between the multiple actors who have a 
stake in that city-region. To understand how city-regions develop different 
governance models despite pursuing the same aspirations, we must 
recognise that city-regions are a site of contest, tension and conflict. Although 
many of the actors are the same across city-regions, we must also recognise 
that their role and, more importantly, their authority will be different in each. 
One prominent example of this would be the state. An important actor in any 
city-region, the degree of authority a state has over the city-region can dictate 
the nature of the governance model and to a large extent its success in 
meeting the aspirations of good governance. All other actors contribute in 
however small a way to the prevailing governance model and its success. As 
a consequence, there is no one model for the governance of city-regions. 
Rather there are a number of models, any number of which can be found in 
close proximity to one another. 
 
Metropolitan and regional governance models 
The governance model for a city-region is the outcome of negotiation between 
the multiple actors who hold a stake in the city-region and its development. A 
simple way of explaining the different types of governance model is to say that 
[Type text] 
 
they can range from the ‘formal’ to ‘informal’. An example of a formal 
governance model would be where a city-region’s governing body is made up 
of directly-elected representatives (including the leader), has tax raising 
capabilities, autonomy over its financial resources, functional responsibility for 
service provision, and the capacity to introduce city-regional legislation. This 
is the model of governance adopted in London and other prominent global 
cities. A key characteristic of this governance model is that the leader is often 
more prominent than the body they represent – for example, Ken Livingstone 
and Boris Johnson (London), Rudy Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg (New 
York), and Arnold Schwarzenegger (California). The very nature of the media 
frenzy which surrounds their election to office, and their capacity to change 
the very nature of the city (for example, the introduction of the congestion 
charge in London) ensures that the leader becomes a figurehead under this 
model of governance. Appropriate for global city-regions where, in political 
terms, there is legitimacy for such a formal tier of city-regional governance, it 
is questionable whether this model of governance is practical and/or 
achievable for other cities. 
 
Compare the US with the UK for instance. While the federal nature of US 
government sees power divided between central government and the 
government of each state, the centralized nature of UK politics sees London 
as the only city currently operating with this formalized model of governance. 
Here UK city-regions operate through less formal governance structures. Still 
operating above local authorities, these city-regional governance bodies 
range from the still quite formal, where group members are all directly elected, 
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to institutions where members are either appointed or indirectly elected. 
Below this, the most informal model of city-regional governance sees the 
formation of metropolitan area boards – a voluntary collaboration between 
local authorities. As well as ranging from the formal to the informal, we can 
also relate models of city-regional governance ranging from ‘strong’ to ‘weak’. 
Naturally the most formal models of city-regional governance are the most 
likely to have statutory status, legislative powers, and additional tax raising 
powers. So what dictates how formal and strong or informal and weak a city-
regions model of governance is? 
 
As intimated earlier in this paper, the complexity which surrounds models of 
city-regional governance derives from the interest conflicts of the actors 
involved and the differences in legitimacy that they share. Central to the 
outcome is the negotiation of interests between the city-region and national 
government. For when it comes to national governments decentralizing 
authority and resources to city-regions, the interests of the city-regional and 
national government tend to be at odds. Recent analysis by Andres 
Rodríguéz-Pose and Nicholas Gill into the devolution process in Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico, the USA and countries of the European Union, concluded that, 
“although national governments would prefer, ceteris paribus, to devolve 
responsibilities (authority) to their regional or state governments with as few 
accompanying resources as possible, the subnational government would 
prefer the opposite case”. Going on to suggest that “the balance between 
these extremes will depend upon the relative strength, or, in political terms, 
legitimacy, of the two tiers of government”, the authors offer an important 
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insight into why some city-regions emerge with a more formal and stronger 
model of governance than others. Simply put, global cities develop the most 
formal models of urban governance because they have the authority and 
legitimacy required to put pressure on the central state to devolve the 
necessary authority and resources, allowing them to have the power to affect 
change but also requiring more accountability in their governance. We can 
say with a fair degree of confidence that when city-regional authority and 
legitimacy reduces in relation to that of the central state, the weaker and more 
informal the model of governance will be. Most obvious in countries such as 
the UK where the asymmetric devolution of state power to city-regions has 
resulted in the development of a whole range of governance models ranging 
from the formal to informal, it can also be seen in countries where each city-
region has the same model of governance. Albeit in a more conspicuous way, 
these countries also show a strong degree of asymmetry within what appears 
to be a symmetrical model of governance. Even within a symmetrical 
framework those city-regions with the most political power, usually those with 
the most economic power but often those with the least as well, will have 
more legitimacy in negotiating with the state for the devolution of power and 
resources. However, this is not the only tension, for there are a whole series 
of conflicts that currently surround attempts to develop new models of 
governance which marry up with the new urban growth pattern. 
 
Conflict between outdated governance and the new urban growth 
pattern 
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A decade ago city-regions were only just becoming a focal point for 
academics or policymakers. Since then, academic discourses pertaining to a 
new city-regionalism in economic development and territorial representation 
have emphasized the capacity of city-regions to bring forth greater 
democratization, improved service delivery, and better economic 
performance. But this new urban growth pattern is presenting a real challenge 
for those involved in the governance of city-regions. Quite simply, existing 
governance models are outdated and do not fit the new urban growth pattern 
of city-regions where the economic footprint extends beyond city lines. The 
race to put the new city-regionalism into practice has therefore exposed a 
series of tensions around the issue of governance. 
 
First and most obvious is the current lack of understanding about what exactly 
a city-region is. Wherever you look in the literature you will find different a 
different definition and set of criteria for distinguishing what is and what is not 
a city-region. For instance, Allen Scott in his book Global City-Regions takes 
those cities with a population over 1 million as his starting point. With 
populations ranging from 2 million (Dublin, Helsinki) to 35 million (Tokyo), the 
OECD concentrates on what it identifies as seventy-eight metro-regions. 
Others focus solely on polycentric mega city-regions such as South East 
England, the north-eastern seaboard of the United States, and the Pearl River 
Delta in China. This lack of consistency has led some commentators to 
identify the city-region as an extremely chaotic concept. 
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Second and somewhat related, knowledge of issues relating to the economics 
of city-regions is far more advanced than issues relating to the politics of city-
regionalism. Though promoted as key attributes of city-region development, 
much less is known about the politics of governance and state 
reterritorialisation, the role of democracy and citizenship in city-regional 
politics, and issues relating to social reproduction and sustainability across 
city-regions. These issues have been marginalized by accounts documenting 
the importance of city-regions for issues relating to exchange, interspatial 
competition and globalization. It also serves to reinforce this tension between 
the new urban growth pattern and the outdated governance models which are 
often tasked with regulating it. The tension that exists here is between the real 
economic geography of cities and regions, based on viewing the world as a 
networked ‘space of flows’ (i.e. connected cities), and established patterns of 
partnership working (i.e. governance), based on the more traditional view of 
the world as a ‘space of places’ and made up of territorial and administrative 
units. City-regions give the closest answer to the former, but existing 
governance models do not reflect in the same way the regional economic 
geography and are instead based on territorial patterns of partnership 
working. To disturb these established partnership-working patterns has a 
reasonable level of risk attached to it, which is not a reason never to look at 
change but it is a reason to be cautious of leaping to a new governance 
model. 
 
Third, there is a tension around whether policy should focus on those areas 
which exhibit the most potential for economic success or those where the 
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greatest concentration of problems are to be found. In one sense it can be 
argued that they are one and the same thing. For example, it is widely 
accepted that while global cities have the greatest potential for economic 
success they also contain very deprived communities. Social polarization is 
therefore a key feature and one which poses challenges for those involved in 
the governance of global city-regions. 
 
Relatedly, a fourth tension centres on the inclusion or exclusion of certain city-
regions within national city-development programmes. To be included brings a 
certain degree of legitimacy and authority to those city-regions, while those 
that are not deemed part of the national city-regional programme can become 
isolated and miss out on the potential benefits of state-assisted city-regional 
development. This is certainly true in countries such as the United Kingdom 
where city-region development is both piecemeal and by nature asymmetrical. 
 
Highlighting once more the tension between city-regions and the central state, 
a fifth tension revolves around the nature of city-region development as 
autonomous city-regional action (bottom-up) or centrally orchestrated (top-
down). Here city-regions are caught in a dilemma. Much of the literature 
emphasizes how a bottom-up approach is necessary to enable city-regions to 
have the ability to operate independently from the state. This enables city-
regions to have the flexibility to respond to their own specific city-regional 
needs and preferences, and the ability to implement policy innovations that 
might be deemed politically sensitive and difficult to pursue at the national 
level. However, the need to operate independent of the state is often to be 
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balanced against the necessity for city-regions to work closely with the 
national government to secure their legitimacy, authority and power. With 
national governments inclined to be prescriptive in what they require of city-
regions in return for the decentralization of authority and power, the 
development of city-regions is often more top-down than it is bottom-up. Again 
the relative strength or, in political terms, legitimacy of the two tiers will play a 
critical role in the outcome of this particular tension. 
 
Sixth, as with any orthodoxy there is a real danger that people get swept up in 
the furore which surrounds city-regions. In particular, there is a real issue over 
the causality of many incidents, events and developments taking place in or 
around cities today. Given the current popularity of city-regions in academic 
and policy literatures, there is a culture whereby people are all too ready to 
identify any sign of improvement as being evidence of the new city-
regionalism in action. What is routinely overlooked in the rush to highlight the 
impact of the new city-regionalism is that the city-regional approach may have 
had little or no bearing on that development. Causality is an important, but 
often overlooked, concept in debates around city-regions. This is because it is 
extremely difficult to overcome the counterfactual argument: “well there is no 
way of knowing whether it would or would not have happened if we had not 
introduced these policies?” Having said that, we need to remain vigilant to the 
fact that it is all too easy to get ahead of ourselves and assume causality, and 
in so doing jump on the city-regional bandwagon. The simple motto is to learn 
how to walk before attempting to run.   
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All of which leads to a seventh tension. This tension centres on the 
recognition that the current orthodoxy which surrounds the city-region in 
academic discourse and political praxis is reminiscent of the orthodoxy 
achieved by the ‘region’ in the 1990s and the ‘local’ in the 1980s. The lack of 
a consistent definition for what a ‘city-region’ is, the failure to recognise the 
critical role of the state and the associated asymmetries of power when 
accounting for the current focus on city-regions, and the narrow construction 
around issues which relate to the economic logic for city-regions, are all 
tensions which characterise the new city-regionalism. But they are also 
tensions which were present in its predecessor, the new regionalism. And 
herein lies the warning. Recent research suggests that these tensions 
manifest themselves as a series of critical points of weakness which served to 
undermine the theoretical standing of the new regionalism in academic 
circles, but also went a long way to explaining why political attempts to put the 
new regionalism into practice did not necessarily bring about the expected 
results. The question which remains unanswered in relation to city-regions is 
whether the same critical points of weakness will in the same way undermine 
attempts to put the new city-regionalism into practice? 
 
The eighth and final tension to highlight is one which underpins many of the 
points made previous to it. Put bluntly, we still know very little about city-
regions. This reflects amongst other things the difficulty which surrounds 
defining city-regions, but also the noticeable lack of an evidence base. 
Figures for city-regions are very often aggregates of smaller units of analysis 
or estimates based on the aggregation or disaggregation of data collected at 
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other scales. So despite ongoing research in academic and policy 
communities the evidence is just not there in many cases. Understandably 
this causes tension because without the evidence base there is a natural 
tendency for much conjecture to become associated with fact. The reality is 
that at present, the answer to many of the challenging questions which face 
city-regions and their planners is that we just do not know for sure. Whilst the 
situation is improving, and significant improvements in recent years have 
allowed academics and policymakers to make better informed 
recommendations, there remains a long way to go. 
 
The lack of an evidence base for city-regions is clearly an important starting 
point for improving our understandings of city-regions. More city-regional data 
will inevitably allow us to gain a better understanding what is going on it city-
regions, but there are other key questions for which it is not sufficient simply 
to have more data and more evidence. It is to these questions that the final 
section of the paper turns.  
 
Existing debates and practices 
The final section of the paper concentrates on a series of currently topical 
debates which it is important to acknowledge, but more importantly 
understand, when working with city-regions. These are the rhetorical power 
and usefulness of the competitiveness discourse, the changing role of the 
state, and finally, the importance of place. Each is addressed in turn. 
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Closely allied to the development of the new regionalism and more recently 
the new city-regionalism, the work of Michael Porter and colleagues at 
Harvard Business School has seen ‘competition’ become the buzzword for 
policymakers worldwide in the past decade. Originally focused on firm 
competitiveness, but more recently on city and regional competitiveness, 
Porter’s seminal thesis on competition, and what it means to be competitive, 
has seen competitiveness elevated to the status of a ‘natural law’ in the 
modern capitalist economy. Recent research by Gillian Bristow at the Cardiff 
School of City and Regional Planning (UK) has illustrated how the concept of 
regional competitiveness is so ingrained in public policy circles that policies 
and strategies deemed to be competitiveness enhancing are accepted 
irrespective of their indirect consequences. But Bristow and others are now 
suggesting that while policy extolling the language of competitiveness tends to 
present it as ‘an unproblematic term’ and as ‘an unambiguously beneficial 
attribute of an economy’, much confusion surrounds the actual idea of 
regional competitiveness because it lacks a ‘clear, unequivocal and agreed 
meaning’ in the literature. Of particular concern is how ,despite the concept of 
regional competitiveness being opened up to suggestions that it is a 
somewhat chaotic and ill-defined concept based on a narrow conception of 
how regions compete, prosper and grow, it continues to assume such 
significance in policy circles.  
 
Given the pre-dominance of the linkage between city-regions and 
competitiveness, this questioning of the competitiveness discourse raises the 
important question of the relative strength of claims made by city-regionalists 
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that, in the quicksilver global economy, city-regions are economic territories 
par excellence. As such, there is a need to consider the causality between 
city-regions and competitiveness more closely. To understand why, for 
instance, the economic logic for city-regions has run parallel to and ahead of 
the political, social, cultural and environmental logic for city-regions there is a 
need to understand the process by which city and regional competitiveness 
has become a hegemonic discourse within public policy circles and academic 
commentaries. In particular we need to discover for which interests (i.e. 
actors) city-regions are necessary and for whom it is merely contingent, and 
whether the new city-regionalism legitimates certain courses of political action 
(e.g. the pursuit of competitiveness) over others (e.g. sustainable 
development)? But it is not just issues around city-regions and the 
competitiveness discourse that are shaping current debate on city-regional 
governance. A second important debate centres on the changing role of the 
state and its association with the emergence of city-regions. 
 
Much of the literature on city-regions and claims of a new city-regionalism 
have advanced the notion that city-regions have broken free from the 
regulatory control of their respective nation-state. However, as noted above, 
recent research has accused these accounts of bending the stick too far in the 
direction of autonomous city-regions. Giving weight to the argument that the 
nation-state and the national scale continue to provide the institutional 
conditions for economic development, critics highlight how the most 
successful city-regions are also those which are located in the most 
successful national economies. An example of this can be seen in the recent 
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work of Pauline McGuirk, a researcher at the Centre for Urban and Regional 
Studies in Newcastle (NSW, Australia). Focusing on the political construction 
of the Sydney city-region, McGuirk has done much to highlight how the 
metropolitan scale, which had little strategic presence before, can now be 
found at the core of Australia’s national regime of economic-territorial 
management. This is despite there having been no formal scalar devolution of 
state power and no formal metropolitan-scaled government in the Australian 
political structure. McGuirk’s work on Sydney, and research by other 
academic and political commentators around the world, is highlighting how 
“city-regionalization is an ongoing and multiscalar process without autonomy 
from the national political economy nor from its territory”. Current debate is 
therefore centred on the degree to which city-regions are autonomous: are 
they, as first imagined, increasingly free from the regulatory supervision of the 
state, or, is the autonomy that city-regions possess only resulted because of 
state authority and institutional structure, state mediation, and significantly, 
state legitimation? 
 
The third and final debate that I want to highlight here is actually more of a 
pointer than a debate per se. It emphasizes a theme that has been implicit 
throughout this paper – place. More so than ever before, place is seen as the 
critical element in understanding the development of, and governance 
requirements for, city-regions. Emphasis on the importance of noncodifiable 
production conventions and inter-firm associations (e.g. trust, loyalty, 
familiarity) to being competitive has raised the awareness that institutions are 
notoriously bad travellers. While you can uplift an institution or model of 
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governance from a successful city-region and plant it in a less successful city-
region, you cannot transfer the noncodifiable production conventions. All of 
which makes it extremely difficult for less successful city-regions to mimic the 
institutional arrangements of more successful city-regions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has highlighted how there is no one model for city-regional 
governance. What exists are a series of models ranging from the formal to the 
informal, the strong to the weak. Each city-region’s model of governance is 
developed from a set of pressures and demands which are constantly being 
renegotiated in response to place-specific pressures and demands. Of these 
the key determinant as to how a city-regions governance arrangement takes 
shape is the legitimacy that particular city-region has in relation to the state. 
Generally speaking the more legitimacy a city-region has in relation to its state 
the more formal and strong the governance arrangement will be. Albeit an 
important one, this is only one of the many negotiations that take place on a 
day-to-basis between actors who hold a stake in city-regions around the 
world. In each case it is the political outcome of these negotiations which 
shapes the model of city-regional governance adopted and the unique place-
specific characteristics that define that city-region’s governance arrangement.  
